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Non-Technical Summary 
 
The debt crisis in Europe has put renewed emphasis on the sustainability and prudence of 
fiscal policies. The fiscal problems of countries like Portugal and Greece, which entered 
the crisis with high debt levels, suggest that excessive deficits under the common currency 
and frequent non-compliance with the deficit limits have been major factors that 
contributed to the severity of the debt crisis.  
 
While the stability and growth pact required continued efforts to contain government 
deficits, the irrevocable acceptance into the euro area, the weakening of the rules and the 
moral hazard effects from implicit bailout guarantees (i.e., a non-credible no-bailout 
clause) may have reduced governments’ efforts towards sound fiscal policies compared to 
the pre-euro period. In this paper we look for evidence whether euro membership indeed 
has changed fiscal behavior in a systematic way making it less prudent. In our study, we 
compare three different time periods. We may consider the time before the signing of the 
Maastricht Treaty as the period during which countries were neither influenced by a 
common currency, nor by the aspirations to be accepted to the common currency. In the 
period between the signing of the Maastricht Treaty and the start of the common currency 
(aspiration period), countries had to work towards the Maastricht criteria for acceptance 
into the European Monetary Union (EMU) and may therefore have been subject to 
increased fiscal responsibility. Finally, we consider the time since full membership as a 
separate period which is of special interest. The underlying paper investigates whether 
euro membership has reduced the responsiveness of countries to increases in the level of 
inherited debt below those of the aspiration period or even below the pre-Maastricht 
period. 
 
While we find some evidence for such a loss in prudence, the results are not robust to 
changes in the specification, such as the exclusion of a single country (Greece) and the 
exclusion of crisis years. According to our analysis of fiscal reaction functions, the 
reduction of fiscal prudence therefore is not a general feature of the first years of EMU. A 
strong caveat applies. Our results do not imply that  fiscal policies are necessarily 
commensurate with a currency union. Notwithstanding our analysis, countries may have 
been admitted with too large debt levels. Membership in a currency union may require 
lower debt levels as countries lose monetary policy as a means to handle public debt and 
competitiveness problems.  
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1   Introduction 
  The debt crisis in Europe has put renewed emphasis on the sustainability and 
prudence of fiscal policies. The fiscal problems of countries like Portugal and Greece, 
which entered the crisis with high debt levels, suggest that excessive deficits under 
the common currency and frequent non-compliance with the deficit limits have been 
major factors that contributed to the severity of the debt crisis. This view had 
sufficient support to bring forth a series of political activities that led to more 
stringent fiscal rules. Among other things, a new fiscal compact requires euro 
members to introduce debt brakes into national legislation, preferably at a 
constitutional level. While some countries started out with already high public debt, 
countries like Ireland and Spain had comparatively sound levels before the financial 
crisis and banks’ balance sheet problems and public bailouts of banks have been 
prominent reasons for exploding public debt levels and reduced investor confidence.
1   
  In this paper we look for evidence whether euro membership indeed has 
changed fiscal behavior in a systematic way making it less prudent. We do so by 
using panel data for European countries to estimate fiscal reaction functions. From the 
intertemporal budget constraint of governments a higher stock of public debt must be 
associated with a higher level of discounted aggregated primary surpluses in the 
future. While it is unclear when exactly such a reaction of the primary surplus should 
happen, previous studies have found significant immediate reactions (Bohn 1998, 
Mendoza and Ostry 2008) that document governments’ efforts towards financial 
sustainability.  
  In our panel data of European countries, we compare three different time 
periods. We may consider the time before the signing of the Maastricht Treaty as the 
                                                 
1 In the case of Ireland, for example, the IMF (2011) has estimated the preliminary budgetary cost of 
bank bailouts at 38% of GDP.   
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period during which countries were neither influenced by a common currency, nor by 
the aspirations to be accepted to the common currency. In the period between the 
signing of the Maastricht Treaty and the start of the common currency (aspiration 
period), countries had to work towards the Maastricht criteria for acceptance into the 
European Monetary Union (EMU) and may therefore have been subject to increased 
fiscal responsibility. Finally, we consider the time since full membership as a separate 
period which is of special interest. While the stability and growth pact required 
continued efforts to contain government deficits, the frequent infringements of the 
3%-deficit rule, the weakening of the rules and the moral hazard effects from implicit 
bailout guarantees (i.e., a non-credible no-bailout clause) may have reduced 
government efforts below those of the aspiration period or even below the pre-
Maastricht period.  
  Using fiscal reaction functions for a panel of actual euro-area countries the 
paper investigates whether euro membership has reduced the responsiveness of 
countries to increases in the level of inherited debt compared to the period prior to 
succession to the euro. While we find some evidence for such a loss in prudence, the 
results are not robust to changes in the specification, such as an exclusion of Greece 
from the panel. This suggests that the current debt problems may result to a large 
extent from pre-existing debt levels prior to entry or from a larger need for fiscal 
prudence in a common currency as an adverse change in the fiscal reaction functions 
for most countries does not apply. 
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews 
the intertemporal budget constraint of the government as a starting point for the 
analysis of sustainability issues. Section 3 introduces the concept of the fiscal reaction 
functions. Section 4 provides some descriptive statistics before we present the main 
empirical results in section 5. Section 6 provides some conclusions.  
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2     The Sustainability of Government Debt 
  The assessment of the sustainability of government finances usually starts 
from the intertemporal budget constraint of the government. Assuming a time 
invariant interest rate, the governmental budget constraint can be expressed as: 
 
        1    ·                                          (1) 
 
where    denotes the actual stock of real debt,   stands for the nominal interest rate, 
     represents the pre-existing stock of debt and    is the primary (non-interest) 
balance, with    < 0 representing a primary surplus. Normalizing the stock of public 
debt and the primary deficit by nominal GDP and solving equation (1) forward in 
time yields the following intertemporal budget constraint 
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where  and  are the real growth rate and the inflation rate respectively (that for 
simplicity are assumed to be time invariant). Discounting equation (2) to time zero, 
i.e. multiplying both sides by  
   
           
  
, and taking the limit as   ∞  yields the 
present value budget constraint: 
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Fiscal sustainability for  1       1    1      requires that the government does 
not engage in a Ponzi scheme, where all the interest payments are covered by new 
debt. The no-Ponzi or transversality condition is technically stated by the fact that the  
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present discounted value of the government debt-to-GDP ratio converges to zero in 
the limit: 
 
  lim    
   
           
  
    0  .                        (4) 
 
Inserting this transversality condition into equation (3) yields a formal definition for 
sustainability: 
 
       l i m    ∑    · 
   
           
  
 
    .       ( 5 )  
 
From equation (5), a sustainable fiscal policy requires that the value of the initial 
debt-to-GDP ratio equals the negative present value of all future primary deficit 
ratios. Equation (5) is only satisfied if the transversality condition, equation (4), is 
fulfilled (see e.g. Ley 2010). 
  A large body of empirical studies exists that examines whether (4) and (5) are 
fulfilled. Hamilton and Flavin (1986) was an early study using a stationarity approach 
to test the compliance with the no-Ponzi condition. Employing annual U.S. data over 
the period 1960 – 1984 they find evidence for a sustainable fiscal policy in the US. 
Thereafter, numerous studies conducting empirical tests on the intertemporal budget 
constraint were published, mostly for the US but also for other countries, yielding 
partly different conclusions concerning the fiscal sustainability of the respective states 
(see e.g. Wilcox 1989, Kremers 1989, Haug 1990, Hakkio and Rush 1991 or Trehan 
and Walsh 1991).  
  These standard test procedures are conducted under the strong assumption of 
certainty. However, Bohn (1998) as well as Perotti (2007) emphasize that 
expectations and uncertainty, surrounding prospective fiscal variables, play an 
important role in the assessment of fiscal policy. In the presence of uncertainty an  
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adequate solvency test requires a correct discount factor, which is determined by the 
marginal rate of substitution between consumption at time t and time t + 1, rather than 
the “safe interest rate”. The possibility that some of the existing empirical tests rest 
on incorrect discount factors casts doubt on their reliability. However, since the 
correct discount factor is based on several assumptions about prospective states of 
nature that are hard to estimate, Bohn (1998) suggests the alternative concept of a 
fiscal reaction function (“model-based sustainability” approach i.e. MBS) to assess 
fiscal sustainability. In contrast to the standard empirical methods, the MBS approach 
tests for particular time series properties of fiscal data and does not require any 
assumptions about the appropriate discount factors. In addition, the MBS approach 
neither requires specific assumptions about the debt structure in terms of its 
composition nor does this approach require any particular information on the design 
of fiscal policy. 
3    Fiscal Reaction Functions 
  The idea of Bohn’s (1998) MBS approach rests on the analysis of how the 
primary fiscal balance (i.e. fiscal balance excluding the interest payments on public 
debt) reacts to variations in the sovereign debt caused by economic shocks. In such a 
framework, fiscal policy is considered sustainable once the government reacts 
systematically to a change in public debt by adjusting the primary fiscal balance. The 
intuition is, that if a fiscal policy is considered sustainable prior to a certain economic 
shock, the absence of any systematic policy reaction to this shock would cause the 
additionally issued debt to be uncovered by future surpluses, thus violating the no-
Ponzi condition. Therefore, the government has to react systematically to the  
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extended debt-to-GDP ratio by increasing the primary surplus-to-GDP ratio, in order 
to maintain fiscal sustainability. 
In the simplest and most common version it assumes a linear connection 
between the inherited debt level and the primary surplus of period t. 
 
  t t t d s      , (6) 
 
where  t s  is the primary surplus of period t as a fraction of GDP,  t d  is the initial debt 
in terms of GDP, and  t   is representing other influences of the primary surplus. 
According to Proposition 1 in Bohn (2008), if  t   is bounded as a share of GDP and 
the present value of GDP is finite, then  0    satisfies the economy’s intertemporal 
budget constraint and the no-Ponzi condition. Hence, a significantly positive   is a 
strong indicator for fiscal sustainability.  
Using historical annual US fiscal data, Bohn (1998) finds significant response 
coefficients for the period 1916 – 1995 as well as for the period 1793 – 2003 and thus 
concludes that U.S. fiscal policy has been in line with sustainability for these 
particular periods. Similarly, Greiner et al. (2007) investigate whether several Euro-
area countries (Germany, France, Italy and Portugal) have restored their fiscal 
imbalance by appropriately adjusting their fiscal policy. Applying Bohn’s MBS 
approach on annual fiscal data over the period 1960-2003 they find positive and 
robust response coefficients, thus concluding that fiscal policy in these European 
countries follows a sustainable path.   
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  Mendoza and Ostry (2008) apply Bohn’s approach to inspect fiscal 
sustainability in both emerging economies and advanced economies. Analyzing 
annual fiscal data over the periods 1970-2005 (for industrial countries) and 1990-
2005 (for emerging countries) to a panel of 34 emerging and 21 industrial countries, 
they conclude that both emerging and industrial countries operate a sustainable fiscal 
policy. For a very recent application see also Ghosh et al. (2013). To the best of our 
knowledge, none of the existing papers highlights the role of euro membership for 
fiscal reaction functions as will be the emphasis in the following sections.  
4   Descriptive  Statistics 
  Before turning to regressions we look at public debt and primary deficit ratios 
over time. Figure 1 and Figure 2 illustrate the development of public debt and primary 
deficits for all countries that currently are members of the euro area. From the mid-
1990s the countries now comprising the euro area pursued a policy of fiscal 
consolidation in order to fulfill the requirements for the start of the European 
Monetary Union in 1999. While during the period 1995–2006 public debt ratios and 
primary deficit ratios were decreasing, the financial crisis triggered a period of 
significant increases in deficit and debt ratios. In 2011, only five (Estonia, Finland, 
Luxembourg, Slovak Republic and Slovenia) out of 17 euro-area countries had a debt 
ratio below the 60% agreed in the Maastricht treaty. Only six (Austria, Estonia, 
Finland, Germany, Luxembourg and Malta) euro-area countries had a deficit below 
3% of GDP.  
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Figure 1: Public Debt: Time Series  
(Percent of GDP) 
 
Note: Based on unweighted country averages. Core euro countries are Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembour, Netherlands Portugal and Spain. New euro 
countries are Estland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus. Source: Own calculations based 
on the OECD Analytical Database 
 
Figure 2: Primary Deficits: Time Series  
(Percent of GDP) 
 
Note: Based on unweighted country averages. Core euro countries are Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembour, Netherlands Portugal and Spain. New euro 
countries are Estland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus. Source: Own calculations based 
on the OECD Analytical Database and OECD Economic Outlook Database. 
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Figure 3: Debt and Primary Surpluses: Cross-section 
 
Note: Figure 3 plots the primary surplus as a share of GDP versus the inherited level of debt to GDP 
for the years 1991, 1996 and 2007 respectively. Source: Own calculations based on the OECD 
Analytical Database and OECD Economic Outlook Database. 
 
  The simple arithmetic of the intertemporal budget restriction discussed in 
Section 2 suggests a positive relationship between inherited debt levels and the 
primary surplus of countries. Figure 3 shows scatter plots of the primary balance-
GDP ratio against the lagged debt GDP-ratio for selected years. 1991 represents the 
period before the signing of the Maastricht Treaty. 1996 is part of the aspiration 
period and the period during the Euro membership is covered by the figure for 2007. 
The scatter plots indeed suggest that the positive correlation has become weaker over 
time. It will be the purpose of the next section to investigate the existence of a 
systematic influence of euro membership on countries’ fiscal reaction functions.  
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5    Empirical Analysis of Fiscal Adjustments 
  Our cross-country application of Bohn’s (1998) MBS approach is based on an 
unbalanced panel data set for the 17 current euro-area countries during the period 
1970–2011. While for most of the founding countries of the euro, data are available 
for the period 1970–2012, the corresponding data for some euro-area countries, in 
particular the eastern European countries, start later.
2 Important variables are the total 
public debt ratio, the primary fiscal balance, real GDP, and total government 
expenditures. We use information from the OECD Analytical Database on general 
government gross financial liabilities, government deficit / surplus, real GDP at 
current prices, and total expenditure of general government. For the gross government 
interest payments we use data from the OECD Economic Outlook Database. Since 
fiscal data for Germany prior to reunification are not available in the OECD and IMF 
databases, we collect the required data from the German Federal Statistical Office. 
Table 2A of the Appendix contains summary statistics for the variables under 
consideration for the full sample period as well as the samples corresponding to 
period before the Maastricht Treaty, the samples corresponding to the aspiration 
period and the period after the Maastricht Treaty respectively. 
Similar to Mendoza and Ostry (2008) we estimate a cross-country panel 
version of Bohn’s (1998) MBS approach. We will start by examining how the 
primary surplus to GDP ratio in the EMU reacts to variations in the debt-to-GDP ratio 
by estimating variants of the equation 
 
    ,        ,         ,      ,   ,         ( 7 )  
 
                                                 
2 Table 1A in the appendix gives an overview of data availability for all countries included in our 
study.  
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where   ,  is the primary surplus,   ,    denotes the lagged debt to GDP ratio,   ,  is a 
vector which includes a set of determinants of the primary surplus and   ,  represents 
an error term. Following Greiner et al. (2007) we use lagged values of debt to GDP 
rather than actual values to avoid simultaneity problems. Depending on the model 
specification, the vector   ,  includes different regressors following the relevant 
literature (e.g., Bohn 1998, Mendoza and Ostry 2008).  
  Table 1 reports results for variants of equation (7). All regressions include 
country and time fixed effects; the t-statistics are corrected for potential 
heteroskedasticity and country-specific serial correlation in the residuals. Column I 
presents a regression that uses the lagged debt to GDP ratio as the only regressor. 
Column II displays the results for a specification that adds a measure of the output 
deviation as an explanatory variable. Among other things, it may capture the 
resistance against high primary surplus in times of a flat economy. Column III, 
following Bohn (1998), and Mendoza and Ostry (2008), adds the expenditure 
deviation, which has been suggested to account for shocks in expenditure needs, 
along with a measure of the output deviation. The variables output deviation and 
expenditure deviation are derived as percentage deviations of output and government 
expenditures from their respective trends using the Hodrick-Prescott filter and a 
standard smoothing parameter of λ = 100. 
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Table 1. Debt Sustainability Regression (1970-2011) 
        (dependent variable: primary surplus as share of GDP) 
   I  II  III 
debt-gdp ratio (    0.043*** 0.046***  0.059*** 
  (3.53)   (3.59)  (3.45) 
output deviation   0.039 0.334*** 
  (0.88) (3.32) 
expenditure deviation  -0.391*** 
  (5.09) 
R2 0.422 0.431  0.594 
No. of observations  512 511  404 
Note: All regressions include unreported country fixed effects and time fixed effects. The sample is 
unbalanced and covers years 1970-2011. t-values in parentheses are corrected for heteroskedasticity 
and serial autocorrelation in the errors. “*”, “**” and “***” denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 
percent confidence level, respectively. output deviation and expenditure deviation are calculated from 
the cyclical components from the Hodrick-Prescott filter and included in percent of the trend figures. 
 
  All regressions provide evidence for a positive and statistically significant 
parameter   that captures the fiscal reaction behavior. The result in column I indicates 
that the euro-area countries for the whole sample period reacted to a one percentage 
point increase in the lagged debt to GDP ratio by increasing the primary surplus to 
GDP ratio by 0.043 percentage points. This systematic response provides evidence for 
overall sustainable fiscal policies. Adding cyclical fluctuations in output to the set of 
explanatory variables (column II) leaves the coefficient largely unchanged (  = 
0.046). The estimated coefficient of the output deviation is positive as expected, i.e. a 
good economy is good for primary surpluses, but insignificant in column II. The 
estimated coefficient   is largely robust to this inclusion of our measures of the 
expenditure deviation and  output deviation (column III). The estimates of the 
response coefficients in Table 1, ranging from 0.043 to 0.059, are in line with the 
findings of Bohn (1998), Bohn (2008), Greiner et al. (2007), and Mendoza and Ostry 
(2007) for other sets of countries. They are also robust to exclusion of the crisis years 
2009-2011. 
  In a next step, we ask whether the prudence of fiscal policies has been 
thwarted by euro membership and euro-area countries have changed their fiscal 
behavior. In particular, we are interested in the possibility that fiscal reaction  
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functions differ across different periods. We may consider the time before the signing 
of the Maastricht Treaty (pre) as a stage during which countries were neither 
influenced by having a common currency, nor by the aspirations to be accepted to the 
common currency. In the period between signing of the Maastricht Treaty and the 
start of the common currency countries faced the Maastricht criteria which were 
important for acceptance into EMU with possibly stronger incentives for fiscal 
responsibility. More precisely, from 1992 we define a country to be in this aspiration 
period once it is also an official member of the European exchange rate mechanism, 
but not a euro member yet. Finally, we consider the time since full membership began 
(eur) as a separate time period that is of special interest. Table 3A in the appendix 
contains the exact classification of pre and eur for each country in the sample. A 
plausible hypothesis may be that the attainment of a de jure irrevocable membership 
status has reduced the prudence of fiscal policies. This leads us to estimate variants of 
the equation 
 
  ,        ,                            ·   ,            ·   ,         ,      ,  ,  (8) 
 
where again   ,  is a vector that includes a set of determinants of the primary surplus. 
The dummy variable     equals one for the time before the signing of the Maastricht 
Treaty and the dummy variable     equals one since full euro membership (i.e. 1999 
for most countries). In addition,     ·   ,    (    ·   ,   ) represent interaction terms 
between the debt-to-GDP ratio in the previous period and the     dummy (the     
dummy). Depending on the model specification,   ,  also includes the percentage 
deviation of real GDP from its trend and the percentage deviation of total government 
expenditures to its trend as in Table 1. As we want to test for the change in fiscal 
behavior within the three periods, the coefficients of interest are  ,         . The 
coefficient    determines whether the primary surplus reacts systematically to 
variations in the lagged debt to GDP ratio in the aspiration period, which  
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econometrically serves as the default period. The coefficient    shows whether the 
response of the primary surplus to changes in the inherited debt to GDP ratio is 
different within the aspiration period and the pre-Maastricht period. The main 
coefficient of interest is    that captures a possible difference between the aspiration 
period and the period of euro membership.   
 
Table 2. Debt Sustainability Regressions (1970-2011) 
        (dependent variable: primary surplus as share of GDP) 
  I II IV 
debt-gdp ratio (    0.070*** 0.072*** 0.088*** 
  (5.54) (5.53) (5.43) 
pre    )  -0.010 -0.009 -0.003 
  (1.05) (0.93) (0.33) 
eur   2)  0.015 0.012 0.009 
  (1.49) (1.26) (1.15) 
pre_lagged_debt   3   -0.070*** -0.070*** -0.063*** 
  (5.88) (6.01) (4.98) 
eur_lagged_debt (     -0.026** -0.024** -0.022** 
  (2.17) (2.05) (2.30) 
output deviation  0.039 0.323*** 
  (1.02) (3.51) 
 expenditure deviation  -0.358*** 
  (4.52) 
R2 0.521 0.531 0.660 
No. of observations  512 511 404 
Note: All regressions include unreported country and time fixed effects. The sample is unbalanced and 
covers years 1970-2011. t-values in parentheses are corrected for heteroskedasticity and serial 
autocorrelation in the errors. “*”, “**” and “***” denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent 
confidence level, respectively. output deviation and expenditure deviation are calculated from the 
cyclical components from the Hodrick-Prescott filter and included in percent of the trend figures. 
 
  The results derived from this exercise seem to be in line with a popular view 
that, while governments undertook efforts to secure entry into EMU, the fiscal rules 
of EMU were insufficient to produce a similarly high level of fiscal prudence after 
countries were admitted to the euro: in all three specifications, the relevant interaction 
term eur_lagged_debt is negative and significant at the 5 percent level. At the same 
time, in all three regressions the simultaneous inclusion of the coefficients debt-gdp 
ratio and eur_lagged_debt continues to yield a significantly positive reaction to debt  
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shocks as the addition of   and    coefficients is positive and statistically significant. 
This can be interpreted in favor of an overall sustainable policy for the period since 
1999. This is in contrast to what can be said for the pre-Maastricht period; the 
addition of debt-gdp ratio  and  pre_lagged_debt leads to an overall effect 
indistinguishable from zero according to columns I and II, and to a small insignificant 
overall effect (0.016) according to column III.  
  Fiscal reactions of euro members to debt shocks, according to Table 2, have 
been less pronounced than in the period before euro membership. While this may 
conform to popular beliefs, there may be doubt about the robustness of this result. 
One possible reason for such doubt is the inclusion of the crisis years 2009-2011, 
which may have a decisive influence on the results due to huge deficits. Another issue 
is that the regressions presented in Table 2 ignore country heterogeneity. While the 
short experience with fiscal policies in the euro era suggests using panel data, the 
results reflect the fiscal reactions of quite heterogeneous countries. A particular 
concern may be related to Greece. While the data used in our regressions are based on 
revised data, the political process in Greece had to rely on cross misstatements of the 
budget deficit.  
  To investigate the robustness of our results, Table 3 presents results based on 
the omission of the crisis years 2009-2011. As can be seen, this severely reduces the 
significance of the interaction term eur_lagged_debt, which turns insignificant in two 
out of three regressions and is only significant at the ten percent level in column III. 
While this reduced significance could result from a reduction in the relevant 
observations for euro members, it may also be seen as a warning against premature 
conclusions from Table 2.  
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Table 3. Debt Sustainability Regression (1970-2008) 
        (dependent variable: primary surplus as share of GDP) 
  I II III 
debt-gdp ratio (    0.066*** 0.067*** 0.075*** 
  (5.62) (5.64) (6.71) 
pre    )  -0.001 -0.001 0.005 
  (0.12) (0.08) (0.73) 
eur   2)  0.008 0.007 0.001 
  (0.77) (0.67) (0.15) 
pre_lagged_debt   3   -0.072*** -0.072*** -0.064*** 
  (5.94) (5.97) (5.41) 
eur_lagged_debt (     -0.022 -0.022  -0.023** 
  (1.78) (1.78) (2.52) 
output deviation  0.025 0.310*** 
  (0.95) (6.38) 
expenditure deviation  -0.304*** 
  (6.62) 
R2  0.575 0.580 0.690 
No. of observations  461 461 354 
Note: All regressions include unreported country and time fixed effects. The sample is unbalanced and 
covers years 1970-2008. t-values in parentheses are corrected for heteroskedasticity and serial 
autocorrelation in the errors. “*”, “**” and “***” denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent 
confidence level, respectively. output deviation and expenditure deviation are calculated from the 
cyclical components from the Hodrick-Prescott filter and included in percent of the trend figures. 
  As noted, another issue is that the results that suggest a reduced fiscal reaction 
to debt shocks may arise from heterogeneity or may rest only on a small subgroup of 
countries. We therefore ran robustness checks by leaving out one country after the 
other in turn. Results are reported in Table 4 which is based on regressions using 
years 1970-2011. Again, we are particularly interested in the robustness of the 
negative eur_lagged_debt coefficient. We find that the results are pretty stable for all 
exclusions except one. When leaving Greece out of the sample, the magnitude of the 
coefficient drops by more than two-thirds and its significance is lost. The result of the 
regressions in Table 2, which suggested euro membership has significantly decreased 
fiscal reactions to debt, seems to be very strongly based on the change in Greek fiscal 
policy compared to pre-euro years.  
  There are two potential explanations that come to mind. A first possibility is 
that the data we are using is not the data that was available to Greek parliament and  
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the wider public at the time budgets were drafted. The extensive fabrication of Greek 
budget deficit numbers has been extensively documented.
3 Rerunning regression III 
of Table 3 with the initially reported Greek deficit figures for the years 2000-2008 
using the data provided by European Commission (2010) implies that 
eur_lagged_debt is still estimated to be significantly negative at the 6 percent level.  
 
Table 4. Debt Sustainability Regressions with Country Exclusions (1970-2011) 
(dependent variable: primary surplus as share of GDP) 
Excluded 
Country 
debt-gdp-
ratio  t-statistic  pre_lag_debt  t-statistic eur_lag_debt t-statistic  adj.  R2 Observations 
Austria 0.086***  (5.36)  -0.060***  (-4.66) -0.022** (-2.31)  0.688  368 
Belgium 0.110***  (5.44)  -0.085***  (-6.73) -0.043*** (-3.83)  0.671  372 
Cyprus 0.088***  (5.32)  -0.064***  (-4.86) -0.023** (-2.34)  0.656  388 
Estonia 0.092***  (5.55)  -0.068***  (-4.94) -0.025** (-2.38)  0.673  388 
Finland 0.083***  (4.98)  -0.052***  (-3.95) -0.018* (-1.86)  0.644  367 
France 0.092***  (5.59)  -0.056***  (-4.31) -0.021** (-2.11)  0.668  371 
Germany 0.084***  (5.32)  -0.063***  (-4.86) -0.021** (-2.22)  0.667  383 
Greece  0.088***  (5.27)  -0.058***  (-4.73)  -0.006  (-0.71)  0.668  380 
Ireland 0.060***  (4.19)  -0.064***  (-5.12) -0.025*** (-2.75)  0.701  378 
Italy 0.083***  (4.80)  -0.058***  (-3.97) -0.021* (-1.79)  0.655  372 
Luxembourg 0.094***  (5.51)  -0.071*** (-4.78) -0.029** (-2.26)  0.655  382 
Malta 0.087***  (5.38)  -0.063***  (-4.88) -0.023** (-2.35)  0.662  392 
Netherlands 0.090***  (5.36)  -0.064***  (-4.98) -0.023** (-2.31)  0.654  387 
Portugal 0.089***  (5.47)  -0.064***  (-5.00) -0.023** (-2.36)  0.654  387 
Slovak Rep.  0.086***  (5.30)  -0.063***  (-4.92) -0.020** (-2.12)  0.641  388 
Slovenia 0.089***  (5.48)  -0.063***  (-4.88) -0.024** (-2.38)  0.657  388 
Spain 0.089***  (5.36)  -0.067***  (-5.21) -0.021** (-2.17)  0.651  373 
Note: All regressions include time and country fixed effects. The sample is unbalanced and covers 
years 1970-2011. t-values in parentheses are corrected for heteroskedasticity and serial autocorrelation 
in the errors. “*”, “**” and “***” denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent confidence level, 
respectively. While the regression includes output deviation, expenditure deviation, pre and eur, Table 
4 does not report the respective results. output deviation and expenditure deviation are calculated from 
the cyclical components from the Hodrick-Prescott filter and included in percent of the trend figures.  
  Another  possible  explanation  is  that due to the weak political 
governance, Greece was particularly prone to consume the increased fiscal leeway 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., European Commission (2010). The doctoring of deficit figures also led to comparatively 
large stock-flow adjustments which are needed when the development of the debt stock cannot be 
explained by accumulated deficits. See Moutos and Tsitsikas (2010).   
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from reduced interest rates after euro accession, blocking out the need to react to 
increases in debt levels.  
 
Table 5. Debt Sustainability Regressions with Country Exclusions (1970-2008) 
Excluded (dependent  variable:  primary surplus as share of GDP) 
Country  debt-gdp-ratio 
t-
statistic  pre_lag_debt
t-
statistic  eur_lag_debt 
t-
statistic 
adj. 
R2 Observations
Austria 0.073***  (6.61)  -0.060***  (-5.09)  -0.024***  (-2.63)  0.728  312 
Belgium 0.089***  (8.20)  -0.085***  (-8.19)  -0.041***  (-4.17)  0.720  325 
Cyprus  0.075***  (6.61) -0.063*** (-5.18) -0.023** (-2.51)  0.691  341 
Estonia 0.076***  (6.51)  -0.065***  (-5.10)  -0.024**  (-2.53  )  0.692  341 
Finland  0.070***  (6.55) -0.051*** (-4.35) -0.018** (-2.13)  0.693  320 
France  0.078***  (6.93) -0.057*** (-4.72) -0.022** (-2.40)  0.705  324 
Germany  0.074***  (6.41) -0.064*** (-5.38) -0.023** (-2.50)  0.690  336 
Greece  0.072***  (6.67)  -0.059***  (-5.17)  -0.011  (-1.24)  0.714  333 
Ireland 0.064***  (3.84)  -0.061***  (-4.92)  -0.025***  (-2.63)  0.689  330 
Italy  0.068***  (5.88 )  -0.058***  (-4.42)  -0.017  (-1.59)  0.683  325 
Luxembourg 0.083***  (6.63) -0.073*** (-5.42) -0.034*** (-2.79)  0.691  335 
Malta  0.074***  (6.55) -0.064*** (-5.32) -0.023** (-2.51)  0.688  345 
Netherlands 0.076***  (6.63) -0.065*** (-5.42) -0.024** (-2.55)  0.689  340 
Portugal  0.076***  (6.689 -0.065*** (-5.44) -0.024** (-2.55)  0.692  340 
Slovak  Rep. 0.073***  (6.46) -0.064*** (-5.41) -0.023** (-2.47)  0.672  341 
Slovenia  0.075***  (6.64) -0.064*** (-5.38) -0.024** (-2.52)  0.691  341 
Spain  0.077***  (6.83) -0.069*** (-5.66) -0.021** (-2.29)  0.696  326 
 
Note: All regressions include time and country fixed effects. The sample is unbalanced and covers 
years 1970-2008. t-values in parentheses are corrected for heteroskedasticity and serial autocorrelation 
in the errors. “*”, “**” and “***” denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent confidence level, 
respectively. While the regression includes output deviation, expenditure deviation, pre and eur, Table 
5 does not report the respective results. output deviation and expenditure deviation are calculated from 
the cyclical components from the Hodrick-Prescott filter and included in percent of the trend figures. 
  
  It is worth emphasizing that, unlike the exclusion of Greece, other exclusions 
have only mild effects. Dropping Italy increases the standard error of 
eur_lagged_debt and the significance level of this variable is consequently somewhat 
reduced. However, the point estimate is largely unaffected in this case. A country that 
has some importance for the size of the estimated coefficient of eur_lagged_debt is  
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Belgium. Dropping Belgium from the sample, but keeping Greece, results in a larger 
differential effect compared to the aspiration period.  
  Table 5 presents evidence on the same robustness test using years up to 2008 
only. Again, the exclusion of Greece leads to eur_lagged_debt becoming insignficant. 
Excluding the years after 2008, the same now applies to exclusion of Italy, but the 
loss in significance is accompanied by a somewhat smaller change in the point 
estimate than in the case of excluding Greece.  
 
Table 6. Debt Sustainability Regression for individual Countries (1970-2011) 
(dependent variable: primary surplus as share of GDP) 
Country 
debt-gdp 
ratio  t-value pre_lagged_debt t-value eur_lagged_debt t-value
Austria  0.052 0.53  -0.069  0.66  -0.126  0.91 
Belgium  -0.077 0.41  0.153  0.81  0.313  1.63 
Cyprus  -0.22** 3.14  0.278**  3.05  0.436***  6.51 
Finland  0.115*** 2.74  -0.402***  3.69  0.061  0.39 
France  0.119***  4.10  -0.145  1.71  -0.26***  4.91 
Germany  0.079 0.88  0.14*  1.73  -0.091  0.70 
Greece  0.194***  10.21  0.051  0.33  -0.388***  5.97 
Ireland  -0.151**  2.80  0.151  0.88  0.04  0.09 
Italy  0.151*** 7.95  -0.073***  2.92  0.133  1.45 
Luxembourg  0.941***  2.81  -0.892**  2.60  -1.159***  3.59 
Malta  -0.025 0.27  0.156  1.79  0.107  1.08 
Netherlands  0.02 0.11  0.013  0.07  0.216  1.03 
Portugal  0.228***  3.35  -0.052  0.67  -0.252**  2.45 
Spain  0.275*** 5.00  -0.103  1.63  0.251*  1.77 
Note: All regressions include a constant. t-values in parentheses are corrected for heteroskedasticity 
and serial autocorrelation in the errors. “*”, “**” and “***” denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 
percent confidence level, respectively. While the regression includes output deviation, expenditure 
deviation, pre and eur, Table 6 does not report the respective results. output deviation and expenditure 
deviation are calculated from the cyclical components from the Hodrick-Prescott filter and included in 
percent of the trend figures. The shaded rows mark those countries with a significantly negative 
estimate for eur_lagged_debt. 
 
  The sensitivity of the results to exclusion of countries suggests looking at all 
individual country’s reaction functions to check for further country particularities. 
Table 6 provides the relevant results for the panel from 1970-2011. In total we find 
four countries in the sample that have a significantly negative coefficient for 
eur_lagged_debt. Apart from low-debt Luxembourg, these countries are France,  
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Greece, and Portugal.
4 Belgium has a large positive coefficient, but it is insignificant. 
The results from Estonia, Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta are reported, but due to their 
very recent euro membership these countries have only very few observations for 
which eur equals one and no stark conclusions should be drawn from their coefficient 
for eur_lagged_debt, especially given that these observations are almost exclusively 
from crisis years.   
  While Greece, Portugal and France have significantly negative coefficients for 
eur_lagged_debt, in all three cases the fiscal reaction coefficients for the aspiration 
period (debt-gdp ratio) has been very large. The coefficients estimated for 
pre_lagged_debt indicate that the fiscal reaction functions in the aspiration period for 
France, Greece and also, at least to some extent, for Portugal have been much more 
responsive to the debt level than in the pre-Maastricht period. Here the individual 
country results suggest that the efforts were not maintained after acceptance into 
EMU.  
 
6   Conclusions 
  In this study we made use of fiscal reaction functions, which capture the 
budgetary reactions to countries’ debt levels, to evaluate debt sustainability. Our 
consideration of different regimes (pre-Maastricht, aspiration period, EMU 
membership) has shown no clear evidence for a systematic reduction in fiscal 
prudence. While a panel regression for all Euro member countries suggests such a 
reduction has taken place, this result is not robust to the exclusion of a single country 
(Greece) and to the exclusion of crisis years. At the same time, individual country 
regressions suggest that for a group of three highly indebted countries (France, 
                                                 
4 We have also performed individual regressions for years up to 2008. In this case, pre_lagged_debt is 
(weakly) significant and negative only for two countries (Portugal and France), but given the few 
observations per country with eur = 1 these results are not reported.    
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Greece, and Portugal) the strong reactions of primary deficits to changes in debt 
levels prior to accession to EMU could not be preserved within EMU.  
  Clearly, the analysis of fiscal reaction functions, like other statistical 
measures, is just one tool among several to gauge the prudence of fiscal policies. As 
the European debt crisis suggests, many aspects are important for the overall 
evaluation of a country’s debt sustainability. Nevertheless, the exercise sheds light on 
the overall deficit incentives within EMU and provides additional evidence for the 
very special character of Greece’s budget policy after EMU accession.  
  According to our analysis of fiscal reaction functions, the reduction of fiscal 
prudence is not a general feature of the first years of EMU. A strong caveat applies. 
Our results do not imply that fiscal policies are necessarily commensurate with a 
currency union. Notwithstanding our analysis, countries may have been admitted with 
too large debt levels. Membership in a currency union may even require lower debt 
levels as countries lose monetary policy as a means to handle public debt and 
competitiveness problems.  
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Appendix  
Table 1A. Data availability 
 
 Variable 
Country  Debt to GDP ratio  Primary balance to GDP  real GDP  Unemployment  total government  
             rate  expenditure to GDP 
Austria  1970 - 2011  1970 - 2011  1970- 2011  1970 - 2011  1976 - 2011 
Belgium  1970 - 2011  1970 - 2011  1970 - 2011  1970 - 2011  1980 - 2011 
Estonia  1995 - 2011  1995 - 2011  1995 - 2011  1993 - 2011  1995 - 2011 
Finland  1970 - 2011  1970 - 2011  1970 - 2011  1970 - 2011  1975 - 2011 
France  1970 - 2011  1978 - 2011  1970 - 2011  1970 - 2011  1978 - 2011 
Germany  1970 - 2011  1974 - 2011  1970 - 2011  1970 - 2011  1991 - 2011 
Greece  1980 - 2011  1988 - 2011  1995 - 2011  1995 - 2011  1980 - 2011 
Ireland  1970 - 2011  1985 - 2011  1970 - 2011  1989 - 2011  1980 - 2011 
Italy  1970 - 2011  1970 - 2011  1970 - 2011  1970 - 2011  1980 - 2011 
Luxembourg  1970 - 2011  1970 - 2011  1970 - 2011  1970 - 2011  1990 - 2011 
Netherlands  1970 - 2011  1970 - 2011  1970 - 2011  1970 - 2011  1995 - 2011 
Portugal  1973 - 2011  1977 - 2011  1970 - 2011  1970 - 2011  1995 - 2011 
Slovak Republic  1995 - 2011  1995 - 2011  1990 - 2011  1994 - 2011  1995 - 2011 
Slovenia  1995 - 2011  1995 - 2011  1995 - 2011  1992 - 2011  1995 - 2011 
Spain  1980 - 2011  1980 - 2011  1970 - 2011  1977 - 2011  1980 - 2011 
Cyprus  1995 - 2011  1995 - 2011  1970 - 2011  1995 - 2011  1995 - 2011 
Malta  1995 - 2011  1995 - 2011  1970 - 2011  1990 - 2011  2000 - 2011 
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Table A2. Period Classification by Country 
 
Country 
Pre Maastricht Treaty 
(pre = 1) Aspiration period
Euro Membership 
(eur = 1) 
Austria  1970 - 1991  1992 - 1998  1999 - 2011 
Belgium  1970 - 1991  1992 - 1998  1999 - 2011 
Estonia  1995 - 2003  2004 - 2010  2011 
Finland  1970 - 1991  1992 - 1998  1999 - 2011 
France  1978 - 1991  1992 - 1998  1999 - 2011 
Germany  1974 - 1991  1992 - 1998  1999 - 2011 
Greece  1988 - 1991  1992 - 2000  2001 - 2011 
Ireland  1985 - 1991  1992 - 1998  1999 - 2011 
Italy  1970 - 1991  1992 - 1998  1999 - 2011 
Luxembourg  1970 - 1991  1992 - 1998  1999 - 2011 
Netherlands  1970 - 1991  1992 - 1998  1999 - 2011 
Portugal  1977 - 1991  1992 - 1998  1999 - 2011 
Slovak Republic  1995 - 2004  2005 - 2008  2009 - 2011 
Slovenia  1995 - 2003  2004 - 2006  2007 - 2011 
Spain  1980 - 1991  1992 - 1998  1999 - 2011 
Cyprus  1995 - 2004  2005 - 2007  2008 - 2011 
Malta  1995 - 2004  2005 - 2007  2008 - 2011 
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Table A3   Summary Statistics 
Full sample 
Variable  Obs. Mean  SD  Min  Max 
Primary  Surplus  498  0.0117056 0.0590181 -0.2802633 0.2639207 
lagged debt to GDP  494  0.6112865 0.3277643  0.061  1.700068 
real GDP  646  2.93E+05  4.98E+05  0.245014  2.48E+06 
Government expenditure to GDP  440  0.4621246  0.0636362  0.27655  0.6678635 
Unemployment  rate  575  0.0737983 0.0425735 0.0001501 0.2529919 
Before Maastricht Treaty  
Variable Obs.  Mean  SD  Min  Max 
Primary  Surplus  221  -0.0022736 0.0372469 -0.0822298 0.2176089 
lagged debt to GDP  201  0.4879915 0.2711116 0.0799428  1.257202 
real GDP  367  133085.9  251839.7  0.245014  1534600 
Government expenditure to GDP  153  0.452921  0.0655769  0.27655  0.6 
Unemployment  rate  269  0.0608128 0.0406273 0.0001501 0.1930314 
Aspiration period  
Variable Obs.  Mean  SD  Min  Max 
Primary Surplus  103  0.027195  0.0614806  -0.058903  0.2411876 
lagged debt to GDP  90  0.6755618 0.3485286 0.0731141  1.406451 
real GDP  106  366159.7  519575.6  4.81723  1959700 
Government expenditure to GDP  100  0.469983  0.072431  0.3360032  0.6486522 
Unemployment  rate  103  0.0923681 0.0429845 0.0137625 0.1910761 
After Maastricht Treaty 
Variable Obs.  Mean  SD  Min  Max 
Primary Surplus  174 0.0202917 0.0744782  -0.2802633  0.2639207
lagged debt to GDP  203 0.7048703 0.3318579 0.061  1.700068
real GDP  173 587234.1 695331.2  5.81083  2476800
Government expenditure to GDP  187 0.4654526 0.0560109  0.3118289  0.6678635
Unemployment rate  203 0.0815834 0.0395757  0.0223295  0.2529919
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